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Who Owns the Blockchain? How Copyright Law 
Allows Rights Holders to Control Blockchains 
SEBASTIAN PECH*© 
ABSTRACT 
The lack of control by a single authority is an oft-described characteristic of 
blockchain technology. This article shows the extent to which US and EU copyright 
law protects information stored on a blockchain and the manner by which rights 
holders are able to control blockchains. While the two legal systems are almost 
identical in terms of protection of individual information stored on a blockchain, 
there are significant differences in the protection of the compilation of information. 
Because of the EU sui generis rights for non-original databases, both the operator of 
a blockchain and participants in the blockchain network can have rights in the 
compilation of information stored on the blockchain. Therefore, they can both 
prevent acts necessary for the operation of a blockchain. Since this impedes the 
development and use, this article argues for an exception for acts that are necessary 
for the normal use of a blockchain. 
INTRODUCTION 
During the 2008 global financial crisis, a “Satoshi Nakamato” published a 
whitepaper describing the technical features of the cryptocurrency1 Bitcoin.2 While 
there is still speculation about the identity of the person or group of persons behind 
 
©  Sebastian Pech, 2021. 
*   Dr. jur. (University of Bayreuth), LLM (Duke University School of Law). 
 1. See generally Carol Goforth, The Lawyer’s Cryptionary: A Resource for Talking to Clients about 
Crypto-Transactions, 41 CAMPBELL L. REV. 47, 52 (2019) (noting that cryptocurrency is a digital currency that 
relies on cryptography). 
 2. See Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, BITCOIN (last visited Jan. 15, 
2021), https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf. 




Who Owns the Blockchain? 
 
60 Journal of Business & Technology Law 
the pseudonym,3 the underlying technology, blockchain, is said to revolutionize 
almost every part of our lives.4  
Nakamato’s idea behind Bitcoin was to create a payment system that would 
function without any need for a trusted third party to supervise transactions.5 Based 
on this, the Bitcoin website states that “nobody owns or controls Bitcoin”6 and the 
lack of control by a single authority is an oft-described characteristic of blockchain 
technology.7  
However, this general statement only applies to public8 blockchains like the one 
used by Bitcoin. In this case, everyone can access existing information and add new 
information.9 On the contrary, private10 blockchains have a supervising entity that 
grants only selected actors access and editing rights, thus offering more possibilities 
to control the blockchain.11 Furthermore, if aspects of a blockchain are protected by 
intellectual property (IP) rights, especially copyright law, rights holders can use these 
rights to assert control. This applies to both private and public blockchains.  
The question of copyright ownership has arisen only recently with respect to 
Bitcoin. In April 2019, Craig Wright, an Australian computer scientist and self-
 
 3. See Billy Bambrough, John McAfee Thinks He’s Solved Bitcoin’s Greatest Mystery – Who Is Satoshi 
Nakamoto?, FORBES (May 5, 2020) 7:10 EDT, https://www.forbes.com/sites/billybambrough/2020/05/05/john-
mcafee-thinks-hes-solved-bitcoins-greatest-mystery-who-is-satoshi-nakamoto/. 
 4. Banking Is Only The Beginning: 58 Big Industries Blockchain Could Transform, CB INSIGHTS (Apr. 2, 
2020), https://www.cbinsights.com/research/industries-disrupted-blockchain. For a discussion on the 
opportunities of blockchain technology for copyright protected works, see Sebastian Pech, Copyright Unchained: 
How Blockchain Technology Can Change the Administration and Distribution of Copyright Protected Works, 18 
NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1 (2020). 
 5. Nakamoto, supra note 2, at 1. 
 6. BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/en/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2021). 
 7. See, e.g., Nolan Bauerle, Blockchain 101, COINDESK (Nov. 22, 2019), 
https://www.coindesk.com/information/what-is-blockchain-technology (noting that the blockchain system 
operates through the use of a “distributed, peer-to-peer network” that allows users to prove their identity that 
others on the network authorize, which omits the need for “a trusted third party”). 
 8. Public blockchains are often also referred to as permission-less blockchains. Marco Schurtenberger, 
Public v. Private Blockchains: Why Public Blockchains are the Future, BITCOIN SUSSIE (last visited Jan. 15, 
2021), https://www.bitcoinsuisse.com/outlook/why-public-blockchains-are-the-future (“[A] synonym for private 
blockchains is ‘permissioned blockchains,’ whereas public blockchains are often called ‘permissionless 
blockchains’.”). 
 9. Don Tapscott & Alex Tapscott, Blockchain Revolution – How the Technology Behind Bitcoin is 
Changing Money, Business, and the World 67 (2d ed. 2018); Primavera De Filippi & Aaron Wright, Blockchain 
and the Law – The Rule of Code 2, 31 (2018); Shermin Voshmgir, Token Economy: How the Web3 reinvents 
the Internet 60 (2d ed. 2020).  
 10. Private blockchains are often also referred to as permissioned blockchains. Schurtenberger, supra note 
8. 
 11. TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 9, at 67; DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 9, at 31; VOSHMGIR, 
supra note 9, at 60; KEVIN WERBACH, THE BLOCKCHAIN AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF TRUST 59 (2018). 
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proclaimed Bitcoin inventor, registered Nakamato’s Bitcoin whitepaper12 and the 
initial source code of the Bitcoin software13 with the US Copyright Office and 
claimed authorship.14 Wright’s registration caused major turmoil in the blockchain 
scene and the US Copyright Office decided to issue a press release clarifying that it 
“does not investigate the truth of any statement made” in a registration and that, as a 
result, “[i]t is possible for multiple, adverse claims to be registered.”15 In the context 
of Wright’s registration, his motivation16 was discussed alongside the effects of the 
registration of the whitepaper and the software code on the Bitcoin blockchain.17 
This article does not consider whether the underlying technology in the form of a 
whitepaper or software can be subject to IP rights. Rather, it examines whether the 
information stored on a blockchain can be protected by copyright law and, if so, what 
the potential consequences are. The assessment is based on US and EU law18 and 
uses Bitcoin as an example. 
 
 12. Wright registered Nakamato’s whitepaper with the registration number TXu002136996. Wai Choy, 
Dueling Bitcoin White Paper Copyright Registrations – What Does it Mean?, BLOCKCHAIN AND THE LAW (June 
4, 2019), https://www.blockchainandthelaw.com/2019/06/dueling-bitcoin-white-paper-copyright-registrations-
what-does-it-mean/. 
 13. White registered the initial source code of the Bitcoin software with the registration number 
TX0008708058. Id. 
 14. John Biggs, Craig Wright Attempts to Copyright the Satoshi White Paper and Bitcoin Code, COINDESK 
(updated May 30, 2019), https://www.coindesk.com/craig-wright-attempts-to-copyright-the-satoshi-white-
paper-and-original-bitcoin-code. 
 15. Press Release, Questions about Certain Bitcoin Registrations (May 22, 2019) (on file with author), 
https://www.copyright.gov/press-media-info/press-updates.html. 
 16. E.g., Zachary Mashiach, Craig Wright Registers a Copyright for Bitcoin’s (BTC) White Paper and Code: 
the Implications of This Copyright and Why Bitcoin’s Decentralization Will Save the Day, CRYPTO.IQ (May 22, 
2019), https://cryptoiq.co/craig-wright-registers-a-copyright-for-bitcoins-btc-white-paper-and-code-the-
implications-of-this-copyright-and-why-bitcoins-decentralization-will-save-the-day/ (noting that Wright’s 
potential motivation in claiming authorship of the whitepaper and software code may have been to assert 
ownership over 1.1 million Bitcoins and that Wright’s copyrights may be used as evidence of ownership in 
subsequent court proceedings, to charge a fee to individuals using Bitcoin, or to prevent others from interacting 
with Bitcoin altogether). 
 17. E.g., Michael Cohen, Bitcoin Copyright, COHEN IP LAW GROUP PC: COPYRIGHT (last visited Jan. 15, 
2021), https://patentlawip.com/blog/bitcoin-copyright/ (explaining that even with Wright’s granting of a 
copyright, this is not determinative of ownership, and it will be challenging for Wright to legally exclude others 
from using Bitcoin because the underlying code was originally “released under an open source MIT license[, 
m]eaning that everyone is free to use, reuse, copy, and modify the original code”). 
 18. It should be noted that public blockchains, in particular, operate worldwide and therefore other 
jurisdictions must also be considered. See generally DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 9, at 35 (observing the 
“global” and “transnational” nature of blockchains). 
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I. BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY 
Some technological background is necessary to set the stage for the legal 
analysis.19 In simple terms, a blockchain is a highly tamper-resistant and transparent 
database. 
Datasets are bundled together into blocks, and each block is time-stamped and 
linked to the prior block by a hash value, which is an individual serial number that 
identifies the content of the previous block.20 This results in a chain of blocks that 
gives the technology its name. As every block comprises the hash value of the 
previous block, the contents of an individual block in the chain cannot be changed 
without the alteration of every subsequent block.21 
A new block is only added to the chain if there is a consensus among the members 
of the network (“nodes”) on its validity.22 An oft-used consensus mechanism is 
“proof of work,” which is based on the idea of making the generation of false blocks 
unattractive.23 Specifically, certain nodes (“miners”) are given complex 
mathematical problems which they have to solve by spending computational power 
(“mining”).24 The other nodes can check relatively easily whether the solution 
provided is correct.25 The miner who first completes the task can add this block to 
the blockchain and is rewarded.26  
The database is not stored centrally, but is distributed over the network.27 Every 
(full)28 node maintains a complete copy of the database, which is permanently 
updated when new blocks are added.29 This distribution creates resilience because 
there is no single point of failure.30 Even in the event that the database kept by one 
or more network participants becomes corrupt, it will still be available on the 
 
 19. Portions of this section are adapted from Pech, supra note 4, at 10–11. 
 20. VOSHMGIR, supra note 9, at 74–75; Kevin Werbach & Nicolas Cornell, Contracts Ex Machina, 67 DUKE 
L.J. 313, 327 (2017); WILLIAM MOUGAYAR, THE BUSINESS BLOCKCHAIN: PROMISE, PRACTICE, AND 
APPLICATION OF THE NEXT INTERNET TECHNOLOGY 25 (2016). 
 21. DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 9, at 25; Werbach & Cornell, supra note 20, at 327. 
 22. DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 9, at 41–42; Werbach & Cornell, supra note 20, at 327; MOUGAYAR, 
supra note 20, at 20. 
 23. VOSHMGIR, supra note 9, at 46. 
 24.  DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 9, at 23–26, 40; Werbach & Cornell, supra note 20, at 328. 
 25.  Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 9, at 34; VOSHMGIR, supra note 9, at 39; Werbach & Cornell, supra 
note 20, at 327; MOUGAYAR, supra note 20, at 21, 23. 
 28. Besides full nodes, there are also light (weight) nodes that store only small parts of the blockchain. 
VOSHMGIR, supra note 9, at 46–48. 
 29. DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 9, at 22, 35; VOSHMGIR, supra note 9, at 39; WERBACH, supra note 
11, at 96; Werbach & Cornell, supra note 20, at 327. 
 30. MOUGAYAR, supra note 20, at 46, 130. 
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network.31 The decentralized storage of information is an additional safeguard 
against tampering because the change in one or a few copies of the database would 
be ignored by other nodes.32 Data on a blockchain are stored chronologically and are 
visible to all participants, creating a high level of transparency.33  
Another feature of blockchain technology is pseudonymity. By using digital 
signatures and private-public key cryptography, users do not have to reveal their true 
identities when they store information on the blockchain or are involved in 
transactions.34 
II. BLOCKCHAIN OWNERSHIP AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
In this section, it is examined whether the information stored on a blockchain can 
be protected by copyright law and, if so, what the consequences are. In this context, 
a distinction can be drawn between (A) ownership of the individual information 
stored on a blockchain35 and (B) ownership of the compilation of information.36  
A. Ownership of the Individual Information 
The first question is whether the individual information stored on a blockchain 
can be protected under (1) US and (2) EU copyright law. 
1. US Law 
a. Subject Matter 
US copyright law protects “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible 
medium of expression.”37 A work is original if it “was independently created by the 
author (as opposed to copied from other works), and […] possesses at least some 
minimal degree of creativity.”38 “[T]he requisite level of creativity is extremely low” 
and “even a slight amount will suffice.”39 However, a work lacks creativity when it 
 
 31. DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 9, at 36; MOUGAYAR, supra note 20, at 130. 
 32. DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 9, at 2, 36; WERBACH, supra note 11, at 101–02. 
 33. DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 9, at 37–38; WERBACH, supra note 11, at 105; Werbach & Cornell, 
supra note 20, at 327. 
 34. DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 9, at 2, 38; MOUGAYAR, supra note 20, at 46; WERBACH, supra note 
11, at 105. 
 35.  See infra Section II.A. 
 36.  See infra Section II.B. 
 37. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2018). 
 38. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). 
 39. Id. 
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is solely dictated by functional considerations.40 In addition, copyright protection 
does not extend to ideas and facts,41 but only to their individual expression.42  
Whether the individual information stored on the blockchain is protected by 
copyright law depends on the circumstances of the case in question. Details of 
financial transactions are, in general, uncopyrightable facts. Furthermore, in most 
cases, their expression lacks originality because financial details are expressed in a 
specific manner and are thus dictated by functional considerations. However, any 
kind of information, not only financial, can be stored on a blockchain.43 For example, 
the first block in the Bitcoin blockchain, the so called “Genesis Block,” contains the 
words “The Times 03/Jan/2009 Chancellor on brink of second bailout for banks” 
which refers to the headline of a Financial Times article.44 Short phrases such as 
headlines can enjoy copyright protection, but the shorter the phrase, the greater the 
degree of creativity necessary.45 For example, the Financial Times headline 
comprising just eight words is not original enough to be protected. However, other 
information, such as articles or images, can satisfy the originality requirement for 
copyright protection. 
b. Rights 
A copyright grants the rights holder the exclusive right to reproduce46 and publicly 
distribute47 the work, among other rights.  
The reproduction right is the right to “reproduce the copyrighted work in copies 
[. . .]”48 while copies are defined as “material objects, other than phonorecords, in 
which a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which 
the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly 
or with the aid of a machine or device.”49 This includes not only analog but also 
digital copies, such as those on a hard drive or other digital storage media.50  
 
 40. CMM Cable Rep v. Ocean Coast Props., Inc., 97 F.3d 1504, 1519 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 41. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2018). 
 42. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954); Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 86 (1899); Baker v. Seldon, 
101 U.S. 99, 102–04 (1879). 
 43. DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 9, at 42. 
 44. Jamie Redman, 10 Years Ago Bitcoin’s Genesis Block Changed the Course of History, BITCOIN.COM 
(Jan. 3, 2019), https://news.bitcoin.com/10-years-ago-bitcoins-genesis-block-changed-the-course-of-history/. 
 45. 1 Paul Goldstein, Goldstein on Copyright § 2.7.3 (2020); 1 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, 
Nimmer on Copyright § 2.01[B][3] (2020). 
 46. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2018). 
 47. Id. § 106(3). 
 48. Id. § 106(1). 
 49. Id. § 101. 
 50. A&M Records v. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004, 1014 (9th Cir. 2001); 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON 
COPYRIGHT § 7.1 (2020). 
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The distribution right is the right to “distribute copies [. . .] of the copyrighted 
work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or 
lending.”51 This encompasses not only the distribution of a work in tangible form, 
but also the transmission over computer networks such as the Internet.52 To infringe 
on the distribution right, actual dissemination of the work is not necessary; it is 
sufficient if the work is offered to the public.53 
In A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held that users who had 
offered music files on a peer-to-peer (P2P) filesharing network had violated the 
distribution right and those who had downloaded these files had violated the 
reproduction right.54 The same applies for a blockchain which is also a P2P network. 
As noted above, one of the features of blockchain technology is distributing and 
updating the blockchain over the network.55 This not only involves the transmission 
of the blockchain between the nodes, but also includes its storage on the hard drive 
or other storage medium of individual nodes.  
Therefore, rights holders can enjoin nodes from transmitting and copying blocks 
that contain their works. Whether this is the case or not depends on the circumstances 
of the case in question. In this context, it should be noted that transmission and 
copying of the entire blockchain will happen only when a node connects for the first 
time to the network because subsequent synchronization acts involve only blocks 
that are newly added.56  
2. EU Law 
a. Subject Matter 
The legal framework for copyright protection in the EU is similar to that of the 
US. In the EU, apart from a few exceptions like computer programs and databases,57 
there is no general statutory provision specifying requirements for copyright 
 
 51. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2018). 
 52. New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 498 (2001) (holding that an online news database violated 
authors’ distribution rights by selling electronic copies of their articles for download); A&M Records, Inc., 239 
F.3d at 1014; contra 4 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 13:11 (2019) (arguing the distribution right 
only encompasses tangible forms of the copyrighted material). 
 53. A&M Records, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1014; Diversey v. Schmidly, 738 F.3d 1196, 1202 (10th Cir. 2013); 
Peter S. Menell, In Search of Copyright’s Lost Ark: Interpreting the Right to Distribute in the Internet Age, 59 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 201, 267 (2011); 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 
§ 8.11[B][4][d] (2020); contra 4 PATRY, supra note 52, § 13:11:50 (arguing that the act of offering a work to the 
public is not sufficient to infringe on the distribution right). 
 54. A&M Records, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1014. 
 55. See discussion supra Section I. 
 56. Nakamoto, supra note 2, at 3. 
 57. See discussion infra Section II.B.2.a. 
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protection.58 However, according to the case law of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (ECJ), a work must be “original in the sense that it is its author’s 
own intellectual creation.”59 This requires that the work “reflect[s] his personality 
and expressing his free and creative choices,”60 which is not the case if the creation 
was determined by technical considerations, rules, or other constraints that have left 
no room for the exercise of artistic freedom.61 Like in US law, the threshold for 
protection is low. For example, in Infopaq Int’l A/S v. Danske Dagblades Forening, 
the ECJ held that a text comprising eleven consecutive words can be original.62 The 
Court also clarified that facts and ideas themselves are not protected.63 Thus, similar 
to US law, information stored on a blockchain is protected by EU copyright law if it 
contains an original expression. 
b. Rights 
Except some specific works like computer programs and databases, the rights of 
a copyright holder are governed by the Information Society Directive64 which grants 
the rights holder the exclusive right to reproduce, distribute, and communicate a work 
to the public, among other rights.  
The reproduction right under Article 2 of the Information Society Directive is the 
right “to authorise or prohibit direct or indirect, temporary or permanent reproduction 
 
 58. Silke von Lewinski & Michel M. Walter, European Copyright Law: A Commentary, ¶ 11.1.5 (Michel 
Walter & Silke von Lewinski eds., 2010). 
 59. Case C-5/08, Infopaq Int’l A/S v. Danske Dagblades Forening, 2009 E.C.R. I-6642 ¶ 37; Case C-406/10, 
SAS Institute Inc. v. World Programming Ltd, ECLI:EU:C:2012:259, ¶ 65 (Nov. 29, 2011); Case C-310/17, 
Levola Hengelo BV v. Smilde Foods BV, ECLI:EU:C:2018:6181, ¶ 36 (July 25, 2018); Case C-469/17, Funke 
Medien NRW GmbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, ECLI:EU:C:2018:870, ¶ 19 (Oct. 25, 2018); Case C-
683/17, Cofemel – Sociedade de Vestuário SA v. G-Star Raw CV, ECLI:EU:C:2019:363, ¶ 29 (May 2, 2019); 
Case C-833/18, SI v. Chedech/Get2Get, ECLI:EU:C:2020:461, ¶ 22 (June 11, 2020). 
 60. Case C-145/10, Eva-Maria Painer v. Standard VerlagsGmbH, 2011 E.C.R. I–12622 ¶ 89; Case C-
161/17, Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v. Dirk Renckhoff, ECLI:EU:C:2018:634, ¶ 14 (Aug. 7, 2018); Cofemel – 
Sociedade de Vestuário SA, ECLI:EU:C:2019:363, ¶ 30; SI, ECLI:EU:C:2020:461, ¶ 23. 
 61. Funke Medien NRW GmbH, ECLI:EU:C:2018:870, ¶¶ 23–24; Cofemel – Sociedade de Vestuário SA, 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:363, ¶ 3; SI, ECLI:EU:C:2020:461, ¶¶ 24, 26, 31. 
 62. Infopaq Int’l A/S, 2009 E.C.R. I-6644 ¶ 48. 
 63. Id. ¶ 37. 
 64. Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the 
Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 
[10 hereinafter Information Society Directive]. In this context, it should be noted that a directive is not a self-
executing-law but rather, has to be transposed into national law by each EU member state. Nevertheless, the 
national law that implements the directive has to be interpreted in accordance with the directive. 
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by any means and in any form, in whole or in part.”65 This includes both analog and 
digital copies, for example, on a hard drive or other storage medium.66  
While the distribution right67 encompasses only the distribution of works in a 
tangible medium,68 the communication to the public right, under Article 3(1) of the 
Information Society Directive, refers to “any communication to the public of their 
works, by wire or wireless means,”69 which includes transmission over a computer 
network, like the Internet.70 Here too, offering the work to the public is sufficient to 
constitute an infringement.71 
Thus, similar to US law,72 rights holders can enjoin nodes from transmitting and 
copying blocks if these contain their works. 
B. Ownership of the Compilation of Information 
Independent of whether individual information stored on a blockchain enjoys 
protection, the question arises on whether the information in its entirety, for example, 
all financial transactions related to a cryptocurrency, can be protected by (1) US and 
(2) EU copyright law. 
1. US Law 
Section 103(a) of the Copyright Act provides that “the subject matter of copyright 
[…] includes compilations.”73 A compilation is defined as “a work formed by the 
collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, 
coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes 
an original work of authorship.”74  
The elements forming the compilation do not have to be protected by copyright 
themselves, which means that a compilation can also include unprotected elements 
 
 65. Information Society Directive, supra note 64, at art. 2. 
 66. Joined cases C-403/08 and C-429/08, Football Association Premier League Ltd v. QC Leisure, 2011 
E.C.R. I-9229 ¶ 157; VON LEWINSKI & WALTER, supra note 58, ¶ 11.2.19. 
 67. Information Society Directive, supra note 64, at art. 4(1). 
 68. Case C-263/18, Nederlands Uitgeversverbond v. Tom Kabinet Internet BV, ECLI:EU:C:2019:1111, ¶ 
45 (Dec. 19, 2019); Information Society Directive, supra note 64, at recital 38. 
 69. Information Society Directive, supra note 64, at art. 3(1). 
 70. Case C-607/11, ITV Broadcasting Ltd v. TVCatchup Ltd, ECLI:EU:C:2013:147, ¶ 26 (Mar. 7, 2013). 
 71. Case C-466/12, Nils Svensson v. Retriever Sverige AB, ECLI:EU:C:2014:7, ¶ 19 (Feb. 13, 2014); Case 
C-314/12, UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH v. Constantin Film Verleih GmbH, ECLI:EU:C:2014:192, ¶ 39 (Mar. 27, 
2014); Case C-527/15, Stichting Brein v. Jack Frederik Wullems, ECLI:EU:C:2017:30, ¶ 36 (Apr. 26, 2017); 
Case C-610/15, Stichting Brein v. Ziggo BV, ECLI:EU:C:2017:99, ¶ 31 (Feb. 8, 2017); Nederlands 
Uitgeversverbond, ECLI:EU:C:2019:1111, ¶ 63. 
 72. See discussion supra Section II.A.1.b. 
 73. 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2018). 
 74. Id. § 101. 
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(e.g., facts).75 Therefore, a blockchain can be protected as a compilation even if it 
comprises only factual information such as financial transactions.  
In Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., the Supreme Court rejected the 
“sweat of the brow” theory and clarified that the criterion for the protection of a 
compilation is not the effort necessary for its creation but rather, its originality.76 In 
connection with a compilation, originality “requires […] that the author make the 
selection or arrangement independently […] and that it display some minimal level 
of creativity.”77 The threshold for originality is low but “the selection and 
arrangement […] cannot be so mechanical or routine as to require no creativity 
whatsoever.”78  
With regard to selection, the creative effort is based on the decision of which 
elements are included in the compilation.79 For example, courts have deemed a book 
that lists the best eating places80 or a business directory that excluded businesses that 
the compiler did not think would remain open for very long81 as a protected 
compilation because of their original selection. Nonetheless, a selection is not 
original if all available data are enclosed.82 Whether a blockchain can be protected 
because of the selection of its content depends on the circumstances of the case in 
question. However, most current blockchain applications involve the storage of all 
available information in a specific area, which does not satisfy the requirements for 
an original selection. For example, in the case of cryptocurrencies, every valid 
transaction has to be recorded in order to prevent the situation that the same single 
digital token is spent more than once (“double spend problem”).83  
The content’s arrangement can still be original even when the selection is not. 
However, the way data are stored in electronic databases is determined by technical 
considerations, especially around efficiency concerns.84 Thus, one could conclude 
that electronic databases are not capable of satisfying the originality requirement 
 
 75. Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. at 344–45 (1991); Experian Info. Sols., Inc. v. Nationwide 
Mktg. Servs. Inc., 893 F.3d 1176, 1181, 1184 (9th Cir. 2018); Schoolhouse, Inc. v. Anderson, 275 F.3d 726, 728–
29 (8th Cir. 2002); 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 45, § 3.02. 
 76. Feist Publ’ns, 499 U.S. at 357. 
 77. Id. at 358. 
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with respect to the arrangement of data.85 On the other hand, an arrangement that 
increases efficiency could be creative.86 However, information on a blockchain is 
stored chronologically,87 which, similar to an alphabetical order,88 excludes an 
original arrangement of the data.89  
As a result, both the selection and arrangement of information stored on a 
blockchain lack originality in most cases, and thus, the entire information is not 
protected as a compilation under US copyright law. 
2. EU Law 
In the EU, the protection of compilations is governed by the Database Directive.90 
Article 1(2) of the Database Directive defines a database as “a collection of 
independent works, data, or other materials arranged in a systematic or methodical 
way and individually accessible by electronic or other means.”91 According to the 
ECJ, the term database has to be interpreted in a broad way.92 
The wording of Article 1(2) of the Database Directive (“works, data, or other 
materials”) implies that the elements of a database do not need to be protected by a 
copyright themselves.93 In addition, recital 17 of the Database Directive mentions 
“texts, sound, images, numbers, facts” as examples of elements.94 Therefore, even a 
blockchain with uncopyrightable facts such as financial transactions can be protected 
as a database. 
To be independent, the elements of a database have to “retain autonomous 
informative value”95 after being separated from each other for any “interested third 
part[y].”96 The requirement of independence is intended to prevent works (e.g., 
pictures, texts, and music) from being additionally protected as a database 
 
 85. See id. (“All of these problems, considered in light of Feist, will prove very problematic for electronic 
databases.”) (footnote omitted). 
 86. 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 45, § 2.16.11. 
 87. See discussion supra Section I. 
 88. Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362–63 (1991). 
 89. 2 PATRY, supra note 79, § 3:67. 
 90. Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the Legal 
Protection of Databases, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20 [hereinafter Database Directive]. 
 91. Database Directive, supra note 90, at art. 1(2). 
 92. Case C-444/02, Fixtures Mktg. Ltd. v. Organismos prognostikon agonon Podosfairou, 2004 E.C.R. I-
10549, ¶ 20; Case C-30/14, Ryanair v. PR Aviation, ECLI:EU:C:2015:10, ¶ 33 (Jan. 15, 2015); Case C-490/14, 
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 95. Freistaat Bayern, ECLI:EU:C:2015:735, ¶¶ 23–24; Fixtures Mktg. Ltd., 2004 E.C.R. I-10549, ¶ 29, 32. 
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comprising their individual parts (e.g. pixels, words, sounds).97 Although 
information on a blockchain is grouped into blocks that are linked together, the 
individual information, like a financial transaction, still has autonomous information 
value. The fact that pseudonyms are used for transactions so that the true identity of 
the participants is not revealed does not lead to a different result, since at least the 
participants in the respective transaction have an interest in the transaction’s details. 
A systematic or methodical arrangement requires data to be arranged according 
to specific rules.98 The standard is not very high and only accidental or arbitrary 
accumulations of data are excluded from protection as a database.99 The systematic 
or methodical arrangement does not have to be physically apparent but requires that 
“the collection [is] contained in a fixed base, of some sort, and include technical 
means such as electronic, electromagnetic or electro-optical processes […] to allow 
the retrieval of any independent material contained within it.”100 Information on a 
blockchain is stored chronologically on the hard drives or other storage mediums of 
individual nodes and can be accessed.101 
Elements are individually accessible if they can be retrieved.102 This also prevents 
works from being additionally protected as a database comprising their individual 
parts.103 Information stored on a blockchain is individually retrievable—as every 
single transaction can be accessed using tools called “block explorers.”104 
As a result, a blockchain usually qualifies as a database in the sense of Article 
1(2) of the Database Directive. In the following, the Database Directive distinguishes 
between the protection of databases by (a.) copyright and by (b.) sui generis right. 
a. Copyright Protection 
The copyright protection of databases under EU law is similar to the protection 
provided under US law. Article 3(1) of the Database Directive states that “databases 
which, by reason of the selection or arrangement of their contents, constitute the 
author’s own intellectual creation shall be protected as such by copyright” and that 
“[n]o other criteria shall be applied to determine their eligibility for that 
protection.”105  
 
 97. Silke von Lewinski, European Copyright Law: A Commentary, ¶ 9.1.18 (Michel Walter & Silke von 
Lewinski eds., 2010); Estelle Derclaye, The Legal Protection of Databases: A Comparative Analysis, 62 (2008); 
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 98. VON LEWINSKI, supra note 97, ¶ 9.1.23; DERCLAYE, supra note 97, at 65. 
 99. VON LEWINSKI, supra note 97, ¶ 9.1.23; DERCLAYE, supra note 97, at 64. 
 100. Fixtures Mktg. Ltd., 2004 E.C.R. I-10549, ¶ 30; Database Directive, supra note 90, at recital 13. 
 101. See discussion supra Section I. 
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Like the Supreme Court in Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., in Football 
Dataco v. Yahoo! UK the ECJ held that “[t]he fact that the setting up of the database 
required […] significant labour and skill of its author […] cannot as such justify the 
protection of it by copyright.”106 Instead, the decisive criterion is originality, which 
“is satisfied when, through the selection or arrangement of the data which [the 
database] contains, its author expresses his creative ability in an original manner by 
making free and creative choices […] and thus stamps his ‘personal touch.’”107 The 
threshold for originality is low, but a selection or an arrangement lacks originality 
“when the setting up of the database is dictated by technical considerations, rules or 
constraints which leave no room for creative freedom.”108  
Similar to US law, a selection of all available information does not satisfy the 
originality requirement.109 Moreover, in most cases, an original arrangement will not 
be found. As mentioned above, the way information is stored in an electronic 
database is determined by technical considerations.110 As this could preclude an 
original arrangement for any electronic database, it is suggested that the focus should 
not be on the originality of the physical arrangement but rather on the originality of 
the access and retrieval system.111 However, if this system is based on mandatory or 
expedient methods, as is often the case, the originality requirement is not satisfied 
either. Therefore, similar to US law,112 under EU law the compilation of information 
stored on a blockchain is not subject to copyright protection in most cases.  
b. Sui Generis Right Protection 
As described earlier, traditional copyright law requires an original selection or 
arrangement of information. The European legislature established an additional sui 
generis right,113 which is essentially, a “sweat of the brow” protection for non-
original databases, in order to protect investments in the creation of databases and to 
incentivize the EU database industry.114  
i. Subject Matter 
Pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Database Directive, a database is protected by the 
sui generis right if it “shows that there has been qualitatively and/or quantitatively a 
 
 106. Case 604/10, Football Dataco Ltd v. Yahoo! UK Ltd., ECLI:EU:C:2012:115, ¶ 42. (Mar. 1, 2012). 
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substantial investment in either the obtaining, verification or presentation of the 
contents.”115  
The required investment can include “the deployment of human, financial or 
technical resources” while “[t]he quantitative assessment refers to quantifiable 
resources and the qualitative assessment to efforts which cannot be quantified, such 
as intellectual effort or energy.”116 The Database Directive does not define the 
threshold for a substantial investment. However, in order to achieve the purpose of 
the sui generis right, which is to provide incentives for the creation of databases, the 
threshold is low.117 For example, in Directmedia Publishing GmbH v. Albert-
Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, the ECJ held that a financial investment to the extent 
of € 34,900 (about $ 47,700 at the time of the ruling) was sufficient to be 
substantial.118 
Possible objects of the investment can either be the obtaining, verification, or 
presentation of the content.119 The term “obtaining” refers to the selection and 
collection of elements for the database.120 The creation of elements is not 
encompassed here because “the purpose of the protection by the sui generis right […] 
is to promote the establishment of storage and processing systems for existing 
information and not the creation of materials capable of being collected subsequently 
in a database.”121 Therefore, only investments in the obtaining of preexisting 
elements are relevant. For example, according to the ECJ, the setting up of lists of 
horses and riders participating in horse races122 or of fixtures for soccer games123 by 
the event organizer is considered an irrelevant investment in the creation of data. 
“Verification” refers to “ensuring the reliability” and “monitori[ng] the accuracy” of 
the content during the creation and operation of the database.124 Here too, verification 
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in the context of the creation of the content is not taken into consideration.125 The 
term “presentation” refers to the “systematical or methodical arrangement” of the 
content and its “individual accessibility,”126 which includes the structure of the 
database and how content is made accessible for users.127 
Depending on the individual blockchain application, the area of the investment 
can differ. Therefore, whether a specific blockchain requires a substantial investment 
or not must be decided on a case-by-case basis.  
A crucial issue, especially in the case of cryptocurrencies, is the validation of 
transactions before they are written to the blockchain by miners. The question arises 
as to whether the transaction data are generated by the parties of the transaction or 
by the miners, because only in the first situation can the validation of the data be 
classified as verification of preexisting elements. Taking a closer look at the 
procedure, the participants in the transaction determine the parameter of the 
transaction, like the number of units of the cryptocurrency to be transferred. Miners 
cannot influence the details of transactions but rather validate already existing 
information and add it to the blockchain. As a result, the validation process can be 
qualified as verification of preexisting elements. 
The subsequent question is whether this verification also requires a substantial 
investment. The extent of the investment depends on the consensus mechanism 
chosen for validation. The Bitcoin blockchain, for example, uses a proof of work 
consensus mechanism that requires special equipment and a large amount of 
computational power that results in incurring high costs for expensive hardware and 
energy consumption.128 Energy costs alone are more than sufficient to qualify as a 
substantial investment. Indeed, Bitcoin’s annual electricity consumption is currently 
around 78 TWh, which is comparable to the annual electricity consumption in 
Chile.129 
Besides the verification of information, obtaining information or the 
implementation and maintenance of the blockchain itself can also involve a 
substantial investment. As a result, owing to the low threshold for a substantial 
investment, most blockchains will be protected by the sui generis right. 
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ii. Rights 
Article 7(1) of the Database Directive provides that the rights holder of the sui 
generis right has the right “to prevent extraction and/or re-utilization of the whole or 
of a substantial part […] of the contents of that database.”130  
The terms “extraction” and “reutilization” have to be interpreted in a broad 
sense.131 “Extraction” refers to “the permanent or temporary transfer of all or a 
substantial part of the contents of a database to another medium by any means or in 
any form.”132 This corresponds to the reproduction right for copyright-protected 
works under Article 2 of the Information Society Directive,133 and includes, for 
example, copying the contents of a database to a hard drive or other storage 
medium.134 Since the investment in the database is protected, and not the author’s 
creativity expressed in the selection or arrangement, it is irrelevant whether the 
contents of the database are arranged in the same or different way after extraction.135 
“Reutilization,” which corresponds to a communication to the public of copyright-
protected works under Article 3(1) of the Information Society Directive,136 
encompasses “any form of making available to the public all or a substantial part of 
the contents of a database by the distribution of copies, by renting, by on-line or other 
forms of transmission.”137  
The extraction or reutilization has to involve the entire content of the database or 
at least substantial parts of it.138 Under Article 7(1) of the Database Directive, the 
substantiality of parts is either determined by quantity or quality.139 According to the 
ECJ, quantitative substantiality “refers to the volume of data extracted from the 
database and/or re-utilised, and must be assessed in relation to the volume of the 
contents of the whole of that database,”140 while qualitative substantiality “refers to 
the scale of the investment in the obtaining, verification or presentation of the 
contents of the subject of the act of extraction and/or re-utilisation, regardless of 
whether that subject represents a quantitatively substantial part of the general 
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contents of the protected database.”141 Similar to the term “substantial investment,” 
the Database Directive does not define the threshold for a “substantial part.” Here 
too, the threshold is low in order to achieve the purpose of the sui generis right, which 
is to provide incentives for the creation of databases.142 
The dissemination of the blockchain over the network involves both transmission 
between the nodes and storage on the hard drive or any other storage medium of the 
nodes.143 Transferring and copying the entire data stored on a blockchain falls clearly 
within the scope of Article 7(1) of the Database Directive. However, as mentioned 
above, the entire blockchain is only involved when a node connects for the first time 
to the network because subsequent acts of synchronization involve only newly added 
blocks.144 Whether these are substantial parts depends on the circumstances of the 
individual case. Even if the threshold for a substantial part is low, in most cases newly 
added blocks will not be substantial from a quantitative perspective because of the 
overall number of blocks contained in the blockchain. For example, the Bitcoin 
blockchain currently comprises about 670,000 blocks,145 and a new block is added 
about every nine to ten minutes.146 The situation is different from a qualitative 
perspective. In this respect, even single blocks can be considered substantial due to 
the extent of the corresponding investment. For example, the electrical energy 
required for a single Bitcoin transaction is about 620 kWh, which is comparable to 
the consumption of an average household in the US over 21 days.147 The average 
number of transactions per block fluctuates at the time of writing between about 
1,600 and 2,600.148 Therefore, the costs for verifying and adding a single block are 
most likely sufficient to qualify for a substantial investment.  
As a result, the sui generis right can apply to the transmission and copying of even 
single parts of a blockchain. 
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iii. Rights Holder 
Courts within the EU will apply the sui generis right protection in cases that have 
a connection to the territory of an EU member state.149 Specifically, when extraction 
leads to storage on a storage medium located in the EU or when the reutilisation 
“discloses an intention on the part of its performer to target persons in [EU] 
territory.”150 Because of the dissemination of the blockchain within the worldwide 
network, the sui generis right plays a role for almost every blockchain. Therefore, 
the question of ownership of the right is of great importance. 
The initial owner of the sui generis right is “the maker of [the] database,”151 which 
is “the person who takes the initiative and the risk of investing.”152 This can be either 
an individual person or a legal entity.153  
With respect to a blockchain, the rights holder is the person or entity that develops 
and operates it. However, because joint ownership of the sui generis right is 
possible,154 the question arises as to whether nodes can also be rights holders. This is 
especially relevant for public blockchains, where basically everyone can join the 
network. In this context, it should be noted that the database as a whole requires a 
substantial investment, which does not mean that every rights holder has to raise a 
substantial investment by himself or herself. 
For example, with regard to the proof of work consensus mechanism, miners have 
to spend money for hardware and electricity. Even if a miner succeeds in verifying a 
transaction first and gets a fee or other reward for it, he or she still takes the risk of 
not being remunerated for the invested time and money. This distinguishes miners 
from subcontractors, who are paid for their effort in setting up or maintaining a 
database regardless of whether the goals pursued by the database are achieved or not 
and are therefore excluded from the definition of a rights holder.155 Thus, every 
participant contributing to the blockchain can become a rights holder of the sui 
generis right. Especially in the case of a public blockchain, this can lead to a 
multitude of rights holders that are spread all over the world. 
As the operator and the miners own the sui generis right to the information stored 
on the blockchain jointly, how do they decide on the exploitation of the right? 
Unfortunately, the Database Directive does not set rules for joint ownership, rather 
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it leaves the details to the national laws of the member states of the EU.156 For 
example, under German law, it is still unclear as to whether, in the absence of a 
contractual provision, the exploitation of the sui generis right requires the consent of 
every rights holder.157 However, it is agreed that at least the majority of rights holders 
must endorse exploitation.158 It may, therefore, be possible for a single miner, or at 
least the majority of them, to withhold their consent with the effect that other nodes 
are no longer permitted to transmit or copy the entire blockchain or substantial parts 
of it, which may prevent the operation of the blockchain in question. To avert this 
situation, the operator of the blockchain can include a provision, for example, in the 
terms of use for the blockchain software, which requires miners to assign their rights 
to the operator. This is possible because the sui generis right can not only be licensed, 
but completely transferred.159 The operator can then exclusively determine the 
exploitation of the sui generis right or, alternatively, establish rules that allow miners 
to participate in the decision.  
It should also be noted that, pursuant to Article 11(1) of the Database Directive, 
“[t]he right provided for in Article 7 shall apply to database whose makers or 
rightholders are nationals of a Member State [of the EU] or who have their habitual 
residence in the territory of the [EU]”.160 Article 11(2) of the Database Directive 
extends the protection to legal entities which are “formed in accordance with the law 
of a Member State [of the EU] and hav[e] their registered office, central 
administration or principal place of business within the [EU].”161 If an entity has only 
its registered office in a member state, “its operation must be genuinely linked on an 
ongoing basis with the economy of a Member State of the [EU].”162 If this is not the 
case, Article 11(3) of the Database Directive allows for the extension to individuals 
or entities from third countries by international agreements.163 However, under 
recital 56 of the Database Directive, this is only possible if these countries “offer 
comparable protection” to persons or entities entitled under Article 11(1) and (3) of 
the Database Directive.164 Despite several attempts in the US to establish protection 
for non-original compilations, no legislation has been enacted so far.165  
At first glance, it would seem that US-based individuals and entities could never 
be sui generis right’s holders. However, Article 11(1) of the Database Directive 
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makes it sufficient that either the “makers or the rightholders” meet the respective 
requirements.166 In other words, the provision precludes individuals or entities from 
third-party countries from obtaining rights as initial rights holder, but does not 
prevent them from becoming rights holders through transfer from other rights holders 
that fall within the scope of Article 11 of the Database Directive.167 For US 
individuals and entities that develop and operate a blockchain, this might be another 
reason for including a provision assigning them the rights of network participants. 
iv. Term of Protection 
According to Article 10(1) of the Database Directive, the sui generis right lasts 
for 15 years from the completion of the database.168 However, most databases are not 
static, but dynamic in the way that information is changed, deleted, or added. Article 
10(3) of the Database Directive provides that the term of protection is renewed for 
another 15 years if a “substantial change, evaluated qualitatively or quantitatively” 
has been made to the contents of the database, which “result[s] in the database being 
considered to be a substantial new investment, evaluated qualitatively or 
quantitatively.”169  
The changes that extend the term of protection can result from the “accumulation 
of successive additions, deletions or alterations” of the information contained in the 
database170 and they have to be substantial either with respect to the content of the 
information (qualitative substantiality) or the quantity of the information affected 
(quantitative substantiality).171 The substantial change must also amount to a 
substantial investment that has to be interpreted in the same way as in Article 7(1) of 
the Database Directive.172  
A blockchain is an append-only database, which means that information is only 
added and never altered. Whether the addition of new information is substantial and 
requires a substantial investment must be decided on a case-by-case basis. With 
respect to the Bitcoin blockchain, newly added transactions are not necessarily more 
important than those that are already stored on the blockchain, because the latter are 
still required to prevent the double spending of Bitcoins. This may exclude a content 
change that is substantial from a qualitative perspective. However, a quantitatively 
substantial change occurs if a large number of new transactions are added, which 
also requires a substantial investment in hardware and electricity. As mentioned 
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above,173 a new block is added about once every nine to ten minutes. This means that 
the cost of the energy required for verifying and adding blocks is most likely 
sufficient to renew the term of protection. 
In this context, it should be noted that Article 10(3) of the Database Directive does 
not make clear whether a substantial change extends the term of protection for the 
whole database or only for the parts of the database that required a substantial 
investment.174 In the former case, every updated version of a database could be 
protected for another 15 years, leading to the protection of the whole database ad 
infinitum.175 Therefore, it is argued that the term of protection should only be 
extended for the new parts of the database.176 In practice, however, it can often be 
difficult to distinguish between the new and old parts.177  
For blockchains, which are append-only database, this problem does not arise. 
Therefore, there are good reasons to renew the term of protection only for newly 
added blocks—not for the whole blockchain.178 However, as already mentioned, 
because synchronization acts involve only newly added blocks, the entire blockchain 
is only involved when a node connects for the first time to the network.179 Since a 
large number of extractions and reutilizations affect only newly added blocks, the 
lack of extension of the term of protection for the entire blockchain is often not of 
much relevance. 
v. Exceptions 
Article 9 of the Database Directive contains exceptions180 to the sui generis right 
for private purposes in connection with non-electronic databases, for purposes of 
illustration for teaching or scientific research, and for purposes of public security or 
an administrative or judicial procedure.181 However, none of these exceptions cover 
copying and transferring information stored on a blockchain within the network. 
Because the rights arising from the sui generis protection can cause serious issues 
for the operation of a blockchain if its operator has not taken precautions through 
contractual arrangements, the question remains whether such a result is intended by 
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the Database Directive at all. As already mentioned, the purpose of the sui generis 
right is to provide incentives for the creation of databases by establishing protection 
for non-original databases.182 In this context, it should be noted that blockchains are 
usually developed and operated for a specific purpose. For example, Nakamoto’s 
motivation for the cryptocurrency Bitcoin was to create a payment system without a 
trusted third party.183 An incentive by providing IP rights in the compilation of 
information is therefore not necessary in most cases. The same applies for miners, 
which generally do not employ their computational power for verifying transactions 
to acquire rights in the blockchain. Rather, their incentive is usually the reward 
offered by the blockchain network, for example in the case of the Bitcoin blockchain, 
the reward is a specific amount of Bitcoin.184 Moreover, the protection provided by 
the sui generis right leads to additional barriers for developing and operating 
blockchains, especially transaction costs for contractual agreements between the 
operator and miners. This even contradicts the purpose of the sui generis right. 
According to the ECJ, the rights resulting from the sui generis protection “must 
be interpreted in the light of the objective pursued by the sui generis right.”185 In this 
context Article 6(1) of the Database Directive should be mentioned which provides 
that  
[t]he performance by the lawful user of a database or of a copy thereof 
of any [reproduction, alteration, distribution to the public, or 
communication to the public] which is necessary for the purposes of 
access to the contents of the databases and normal use of the contents by 
the lawful user shall not require the authorization of the author of the 
database.186 
The idea behind the provision is to ensure that acts that are technically required 
for the use of a database cannot be prevented by the rights holder as long as the 
database is used in the intended way.187 However, Article 6(1) of the Database 
Directive applies only for original databases protected by a copyright and not for 
non-original databases covered by the sui generis right. Regardless of the question 
of whether the exception in Article 6(1) of the Database Directive could be applied 
to databases protected by the sui generis right in general, the underlying concept 
should be transferred to acts necessary for the operation of a blockchain, which are 
 
 182. DERCLAYE, supra note 97, at 45; Schneider, supra note 114, at 554; Database Directive, supra note 90, 
at recitals 9, 10, 12. 
 183. Nakamoto, supra note 2, at 1. 
 184. DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 9, at 25. 
 185. Case C-203/02, The British Horseracing Bd. Ltd. v. William Hill Org. Ltd., 2004 E.C.R. I-10415, ¶ 45. 
 186. Database Directive, supra note 90, at art. 6(1). 
 187. VON LEWINSKI, supra note 97, ¶ 9.6.1; Database Directive, supra note 90, at recital 34. 






Journal of Business & Technology Law 81 
copying and transmitting of the contents of a blockchain within the network. This 
ensures that the protection provided by the sui generis right does not hinder the 
development and operation of blockchains. 
Here, too, a limitation to the intended purpose of the blockchain should be made 
to protect the interests of the blockchain operator and miners. The purpose of a 
blockchain can be defined through the terms of use for the blockchain software or 
any other announcements of the operator, for example, in a whitepaper. According 
to Nakatomo’s whitepaper the purpose of the Bitcoin blockchain, for example, is to 
provide “an electronic payment system […] allowing any two willing parties to 
transact directly with each other without the need for a trusted third party.”188 As 
long as the blockchain’s intended purpose is pursued, no consent of the operator and 
miners is required for copying and transmitting the blockchain within the network.  
To increase the legal certainty for blockchains, the proposed exception should be 
explicitly included in the Database Directive. A possible location could be Article 9 
of the Database Directive, which already contains exceptions to the sui generis 
right.189 A new paragraph 2 could be inserted, following Article 6(1) of the Database 
Directive, which could read as follows: 
The performance of any of the acts listed in Article 7 which is necessary for the 
normal use of a database stored on a blockchain shall not require the authorization 
of the maker of the database. 
Currently, as part of the “European data strategy,” which aims to enable more 
data-driven innovation in the EU, the European Commission is proposing a revision 
of the Database Directive to provide incentives for data sharing.190 This could be a 
good opportunity for the EU legislator to also implement the proposed changes 
regarding blockchains. 
CONCLUSION 
If information stored on a blockchain is original, rights holders can enjoin nodes 
under US and EU law from transmitting and copying blocks that contain such 
original information. In most cases, the compilation of information in its entirety is 
not protected by US and EU copyright law because the selection and arrangement of 
the information lack originality. However, a blockchain can be protected by the EU’s 
sui generis right regime if the obtaining, verifying, or presenting of its contents 
require a substantial investment. Due to the significant energy consumption needed 
for proof of work, this will be the case for most blockchains relying on this consensus 
mechanism. As the creation of single blocks is already highly energy-intensive, the 
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sui generis right allows rights holders to enjoin nodes from transmitting and copying 
even parts of the blockchain. 
Unlike in the case of a “51% attack,” where a person or entity that has the majority 
of a blockchain’s computational power can change the information stored on the 
blockchain,191 copyright law only enables rights holders to prevent the transmission 
and copying of the blockchain or parts of it. However, these acts are crucial for the 
operation of a blockchain, and rights holders may thus (ab)use their rights to control 
the blockchain in question.  
The sui generis protection is not only unnecessary to promote the development of 
blockchains, it even hinders it. Thus, it is suggested to limit the rights of rights 
holders to acts that are outside the initial purpose of the respective blockchain. 
However, as long as such an exception is not included in the Database Directive, the 
operators of blockchains are well advised to have the rights of the miners transferred 
to them by contractual provisions. 
Another question is whether rights holders will be able to enforce their rights 
against individual participants of a blockchain that are spread all over the world. 
Owing to the decentralized structure, the removal of single nodes has no effect on 
the operability of a blockchain network. Therefore, the statement that no one controls 
the blockchain may ultimately prove true, at least for factual reasons. 
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